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Background: Donor engagement in transitional settings, complex emergencies and fragile states is increasing.
Neither short-term humanitarian aid nor traditional development financing are well adapted for such environments.
Multi-donor trust funds, in their current form, can be unwieldy and subject to long delays in initiation and work best
when national governments are already strong. We reviewed the aid modalities used in Zimbabwe through the
period of crisis, 2008–2012 and their results and implications. Literature review and case experience was utilised.
Discussion: By focusing on working with line ministries in non-contested sectors to determine local priorities rather
than following global prescriptions, pooling funds to achieve scale rather than delivering through fragmented
projects, and building on national systems and capacities rather than setting up parallel mechanisms, the Transition
Fund Model employed in Zimbabwe by UNICEF and partners in partnership with the Inclusive Government was
able to achieve important results in health, education, social support and water services in a challenging setting. In
addition, forums for collaboration were developed that provided a platform for further action. The initial emphasis
on service delivery diffused much of the political delicateness that impeded progress in other sectors. The Zimbabwean
experience may provide a model of innovative financing for countries facing similar circumstances.
Summary: Such models may represent a new practical application of the Paris Principles, consistent with the major
tenets of the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed in Busan. As we approach the Millennium
Development Goal deadline, an over-arching, mutli-sectoral and independent evaluation of this approach is
recommended in order to validate findings and assess broader replicability of this approach.Background
As the international community begins to focus on the
next set of broad-based international development goals
to follow the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
increasing attention is being given to human security
and to fragile states. The number of fragile states glo-
bally is in the range of 30 to 40. Taken together, such
states account for: more than 20% of the world’s popula-
tion (including a third of the poorest, living on less than
a dollar a day); around half of the children dying before
their fifth birthday; one third of those dying due to* Correspondence: psalama@unicef.org
1UNICEF Ethiopia Country Office, Africa Hall, PO Box 1169, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Salama et al.; licensee BioMed Central
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.AIDS; and around 30% of maternal deaths [1]. Indeed,
one of the key lessons learned from the MDG period has
been that it will be difficult to achieve most of the
MDGs without accelerated progress in fragile states [2].
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the evidence
base on aid and development effectiveness in complex
and fragile settings by using the case study of Zimbabwe,
describing the types of aid modalities used in recent
years, providing preliminary information on the major
model used from internal and external reviews, and
drawing initial lessons that may be applicable to other
fragile states or complex emergencies.
There are many definitions and typologies of fragile
states. A United States Agency for International Devel-
opment paper, for example, classified fragile states asLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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arrested development, or deteriorating governance [3]. A
definition proposed by the United Kingdom’s Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) describes
fragile states as states that lack either the capacity, or the
will (or both), to deliver core state functions for the ma-
jority of their people, including the poor [4]. One prom-
inent typology is the Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment constructed by the World Bank; countries
are rated in the areas of economic management, structural
reforms, social inclusion and public sector management.
Countries in the bottom two quintiles on this multi-
dimensional index are considered to be fragile states [5].
Zimbabwe consistently ranks at the bottom of these tables
and classifies as a fragile state according to both DFID and
World Bank definitions [6].
Until recently, discussions around best practice in aid
and development effectiveness have tended to focus on
stable development settings. The Rome Declaration and
its successors, the Paris Declaration and the Accra
Agenda for Action, all emphasized the need for country
ownership, harmonisation of donor inputs, and align-
ment against national priorities as determined by recipi-
ent governments. The common modalities to implement
such approaches were often instruments such as direct
budget support, sector budget support, and Sector-Wide
Approaches (SWAps). Bilateral donors and the Inter-
national Financial Institutions often played a central
technical and fiscal role in such situations including sup-
porting the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy
papers and medium-term expenditure frameworks. The
United Nations system and civil society organisations
tended to focus more on advocacy, capacity building,
and providing support to policy reform. Increasingly, to
assist governments in their planning and coordination in
these settings, donors have endeavoured to provide more
predictable, multi-year support and non-earmarked funds.
By contrast, in fragile states, the default approach has
tended to be to adopt the humanitarian architecture and
instruments. Such instruments – including the humani-
tarian cluster system bringing together UN agencies and
international NGOs - have proven to be effective in de-
livering life-saving interventions in acute humanitarian
crises. However, the duration of complex emergencies or
state fragility may span many years and transformation
of basic governance may take decades. The alternative
development mechanisms, such as budget support and
SWAps, have generally been considered inappropriate in
such settings because fragile states lack the capacity and
governance standards that generally facilitate such
modalities being adopted [7]. In fragile states, national
development frameworks or even sector plans are often
absent. The commonly used model by development
partners operating in fragile states can therefore becharacterised as: limited funding over short time periods;
project rather than budget support; use of parallel sys-
tems such as funding through NGOs and multilateral
agencies, such as the United Nations and World Bank
(including the use of multi-donor trust funds), rather
than use of state implementers; and emphasis on hu-
manitarian over development aid [5,8,9].
Recent research shows that this approach has serious
limitations [9,10]. First, aid to fragile states is often too
little too late. Donors have had a tendency to only begin
delivering substantial aid to fragile states once there is a
crisis. Second, volatile aid flows reduce rather than build
recipient governments’ ability to implement projects and
manage citizens’ expectations about public service deliv-
ery which could exacerbate instability and weaken the
legitimacy of new governments at the exact moment
when a new ‘social contract’ is urgently needed [11].
Third, obsessed with risk aversion, there is limited con-
sideration by development partners of the costs of non-
intervention. Donors have also tended to fund and sup-
port NGOs at the exclusion of government and then
turned their attention to government strengthening late
in the process [12]. Furthermore, the near exclusive em-
phasis on funding and support for NGOs, particularly in
politically volatile contexts, can exacerbate tensions be-
tween government and NGOs which may be perceived
by suspicious governments as partisan in their work
within communities. Ultimately, the fragmentation that
arises from many disparate projects is particularly diffi-
cult for weak governments to coordinate and manage.
Furthermore, commentators state that the global donor
community cannot just assume that aid effectiveness in
fragile states can be improved by simply moving from hu-
manitarian modalities to those that are considered devel-
opment mechanisms [13,14]. Early recovery situations are
unique and require specific solutions based on flexibility
and creativity. Rather than limited engagement until a
state starts performing well in terms of policy and institu-
tional capacity, recent findings tend to recommend more
and earlier engagement with the recipient government as
far as possible [9]. Some have characterised this as
“shadow alignment,” [15] while others have called this
“principled engagement” [16].
In 2007, taking into account these concerns, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries adapted the principles for good international en-
gagement in fragile states [17,18]. More recently, at the
Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan
in 2011, a number of post-conflict and fragile states as well
as international organisations endorsed an agreement –
the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – that
gives clarity on how global actors can best engage in fra-
gile states [1]. The New Deal emphasises building mutual
trust, transparency, risk-sharing, use of country systems,
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able aid. While the New Deal has highlighted the particu-
lar constraints faced by fragile states, the practical
mechanisms for implementation remain unclear. Indeed,
there is very little empirical evidence assessing perform-
ance of various aid modalities in fragile states; Waldman
has noted that “there are far are more questions than an-
swers and far more theory than experience” [3].
There is, therefore, an urgent need to learn more
about development and aid effectiveness in fragile states
and to move beyond agreeing on theoretical principles
to documenting recent country experience. In addition
to providing a test of the Busan commitments, such in-
formation may be timely as, recently, a number of devel-
opment partners have reiterated their intention to invest
substantially in fragile states. Already around 30% of all
Official Development Assistance is spent in fragile and
conflict-affected countries. The analysis presented is
based on a review of the published and the grey litera-
ture on programme models in fragile states, using the
Google Scholar search engine with key words, ‘fragile
states and financing instruments,’ a review of the major
donor mechanisms used in Zimbabwe during the period
2007–2012 with a particular focus on the transitional
funding mechanisms, and on the direct personal experi-
ence of the authors in Zimbabwe and more than 20
other complex emergencies and/or fragile states. One of
the authors played a direct role in the conceptualization,
design, and implementation of the transition fund
model. Two of the other authors are involved in
monitoring and evaluation of this model and other
programmes in Zimbabwe and, one author, although
knowing the Zimbabwean context, is an academic with no
direct role in implementing programmes in Zimbabwe.
No ethical approval was needed for this study which is
presented for debate.
The Zimbabwean context
Following independence in 1980, Zimbabwe achieved
major improvements in coverage of basic social services
and also a sharp decline in disparities. Due to increasing
political instability around the turn of the century, how-
ever, the macroeconomic environment collapsed with a
48% decline in gross domestic product between 2000
and 2008, hyperinflation peaking at 231 million % in
2008, and the unemployment rate reaching 80%. Mean-
while, HIV prevalence rates reached close to 30%, fur-
ther reducing productivity and heightening health care
costs.
These factors led to the near total collapse of basic so-
cial services in 2008. Zimbabwe, once the food basket
for the southern African region, became a net importer
of food with more than 5 million people dependent on
food aid. Maternal mortality rates more than doubledbetween 1990 and 2008 as only half of the pregnant
women gave birth with the assistance of skilled health
personnel. The education system was also in crisis and,
in 2008, government schools effectively closed for a large
part of the academic year as teacher salaries dropped to
the equivalent of less than US$2 per month. Perhaps the
most dramatic example of the deterioration in the social
sectors, however, was the cholera outbreak of 2008 and
2009 which led to 98,531 cases and 4,282 deaths.
After a disputed election in Zimbabwe in 2008, the
three political parties agreed to form the ‘Inclusive Gov-
ernment’ (also known as the ‘Government of National
Unity’) under the Global Political Agreement signed in
September 2008. Under the Global Political Agreement,
the former ruling party - ZANU-PF - retained control of
the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Mines, Agri-
culture, Local Government and Justice, among others.
The opposition Movement for Democratic Change –
Tsvangirai (MDC-T) took control of Finance, Economic
Planning and the majority of the social sectors (Health,
Education, Water, Labour and Social Services) with the
other opposition group, the Movement for Democratic
Change –Mutambara (MDC-M), given smaller portfo-
lios. The relative political stability that ensued under the
Inclusive Government ushered in a period of fragile, but
tangible, economic and social recovery.
A national development framework, the Medium-Term
Plan was endorsed by cabinet in 2011 and replaced the
more emergency-oriented Short Term Emergency Re-
sponse Plan. With the establishment of the power-sharing
government and a consensus that the arrangement, al-
though imperfect, represented the best chance yet for
Zimbabwe to emerge from the political, economic and hu-
man crises of the previous decade, development partners
sought to re-engage albeit cautiously. Despite the ‘consid-
erable international scepticism’ about whether the political
arrangement could succeed [19], since the swearing-in of
the transitional government, donors have committed sub-
stantial amounts of aid returning it to a level last seen in
the early 1990s (Figure 1). The bilateral donors which con-
tributed the most in 2010, included the United States,
United Kingdom, European Union and Australia [20].
Despite this progress, due to the targeted sanctions
imposed during the last decade and consequent lack of
official engagement between the Government of Zimbabwe
and international donor community, very limited direct
donor funding has been provided to the Government
of Zimbabwe and, until recently, humanitarian funding
streams had been the dominant source of support. In
addition, the International Financial Institutions have not
fully re-engaged in Zimbabwe due to the political situation
and the large amount of arrears (according to the World
Bank country profile this amounted to 70% of gross do-










Figure 1 Disbursed official development assistance from all donors to Zimbabwe in current US dollar millions, 1980 to 2010 [20].
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also remained contentious and relatively non-functional
with multiple parties and line ministries vying for control
and continued reluctance of some OECD governments to
engage directly with government.
Description of financing approaches
The choice of financing mechanism used in fragile situa-
tions is critical as it affects how needs are defined and
prioritized, donor behaviours, accountability and cap-
acity development approaches [21]. However, no consen-
sus exists as to which form of lending or granting
instrument is best for fragile settings in order to achieve
multi-faceted development goals. One of the most popu-
lar mechanisms for delivering aid in such contexts is the
multi-donor trust fund (MDTF). However, multi-donor
trust funds historically have a mixed record [22], are
often designed and created outside the country or con-
text in which they will be implemented, suffer from a
lack of clarity on goals and operational structure, and
work best when recipient governments are strongest –
the characteristic least likely to be present in fragile
states. In addition, a recent review concluded that there
is a lack of rigorous and independent research on multi-
donor trust funds [23]. Published literature on other fi-
nancing models for fragile states is even more rare.
During the period 2007–2012, several models of finan-
cing were developed in Zimbabwe, all with the objective
of increasing predictable financial flows to the country
while the sanctions regime constrained the ability of
partners to fund the government directly.
The characteristics of three main types of mechanisms
used in Zimbabwe during this period are summarized in
Table 1 [24]. We discuss the major advantages and dis-
advantages below:
1) Multi-Donor Trust Fund: These funds are generally
managed by the Development Banks with Ministryof Finance as the government counterpart. A policy
committee acts as the steering group with funds
administered according to Bank procedures and
implemented through tendered sub-contracts to
NGOs and private contractors. An example of this
mechanism was the Zim-Fund for Water and
Sanitation managed by the African Development
Bank. These funds follow a tightly defined scope of
work and the administrative rules of the IFIs that
manage them. The strengths of the funds were that:
they had the capacity to mobilize pooled funding
from a range of donors; could draw upon the
technical resources of the development banks
involved; involved transparent tendering and
procurement mechanisms; attracted private sector
and civil society partners; and had the potential to
reduce transition costs. The challenges in the
Zimbabwe context where government was highly
divided and polarized were that: the counterpart
ministry was the Ministry of Finance rather than
relevant sectoral ministries resulting in coordination
challenges with sectors in which the funds were
developing projects; significant delays in procurement
due to stringent processes; limited use of government
systems; and a tension between a focus on ‘quick wins’
and building sector capacities.
2) Global Funds, Basket Funds, and Pass-Throughs:
These funds have generally been managed by the
United Nations Development Programme in
Zimbabwe with a coordination committee
determining priorities and the United Nations acting
as a pass-through. Funds are administered according
to United Nations procedures and implemented
through several United Nations agencies and civil
society organisations. An example of this mechanism
is the Global Fund portfolio on HIV, tuberculosis
and malaria. Here the United Nations Development
Programme acts as an administrative agent with
Table 1 Basic typology of different pooled funding mechanisms and defining characteristics*
Pooled funds from contributing donors agreed and defined in Zimbabwe Global pooled fund or thematic




Aligned to national Government
priorities (not necessarily sector
policies or strategies)
Aligned to national Government
strategies and multi-year plans.
Government contribution
Aligned to national policies and
strategies and priorities
Aligned to national priority Aligned to national priorities
(with some conditions set by
the global fund requirements)
Coverage Have national coverage
relevance e.g. studies
Implemented on national scale
through national structures
No national coverage







legal agreements with all donors,
which specify governance
procedures covering trust fund
management, operational and
financial reporting,
Policies and procedures agreed,
e.g. Joint Statement of Intent,
Code of Conduct, administrative
procedures meets agency
requirements
MOU signed between agencies,
administrative arrangements






allocation made from global fund
Implemented through single or
multiple UN, Government, or
NGOs guided by agreements
Accountability World Bank has financial
management, technical
oversight and accountability
for ensuring high quality results




UN agency identified to manage
fund on behalf of other agencies
with only financial accountability
(meets agency requirements)




Agency identified in country to
manage fund and co-ordinate it
through multi-stakeholder forum
Multiple implementing UN
agencies and NGOs according
to defined roles and responsibilities
Un-earmarked Bank-administered MDTFs do not
allow donors to earmark funds
Generally Unearmarked Generally unearmarked Unearmarked Unearmarked
Management and
Administration Costs
7% overhead (2% + 5%) 12% overhead (5% + 7%) 1–3% overhead for fund
administrator, 7% for
implementing UN agencies
12% overhead (5% + 7%) 3% (ERF) or 7%–12% overhead
M and E M and E developed through Monitoring and evaluation linked







M and E framework developed to
guide all implementing partners
and/or indicators developed by
project using template/guidelines
Examples A-MDTF HTF Expanded Support
Programme (ESP)
COPAC CERF
P-MDTF (Zimfund) ETF-II H4 + *
(ERF)
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are: the potential to harmonize various actors; a
reduction in overhead costs; and involvement of a
full range of stakeholders. The challenges are that:
global and not local priorities tend to determine the
size of funding streams; competition by various
constituencies for resources may actually increase
transaction costs; the limited use of government
systems with procedures determined at global level;
and coordination, technical support and fiduciary
risk management accountabilities are unclear (since
the United Nations only administers the funds) and,
with many sub-grantees, these risks are significant.
3) Transition Fund Model: is described in detail below.
The transition fund model
Genesis
From 2007 to 2010, UNICEF managed a multi-donor
pooled fund, known as the Programme of Support, to
provide assistance to the 1.5 million orphans and vulner-
able children in Zimbabwe. Prior to the programme’s
launch in 2007, just as in many HIV hyper-endemic
countries with an orphan crisis, a major scale-up of pre-
dominately NGO-implemented and donor- driven pro-
jects had occurred. In Zimbabwe, each major international
donor had been supporting a group of NGOs to deliver
services on a project basis to orphans and vulnerable chil-
dren. Prior to 2007, the government ministry mandated to
support social protection, the Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Services (MOLSS), had had a very limited role in this
system and very little capacity to provide stewardship over
the complex set of programmes and actors. In particular,
there was no overall social protection policy or framework,
no standard package of services, and little monitoring and
quality control. One of the objectives of the Programme of
Support was to support the MOLSS in its policy, standard
setting and monitoring role as well as to contribute to
donor harmonisation and alignment.
In early 2010, the Programme of Support was formally
evaluated using the OECD criteria and scored a B rating.
The evaluation noted that more than 400,000 children
had been supported with services and that the flexible
approach adopted had allowed the support to continue
even through a major national humanitarian crisis. How-
ever, the evaluation also noted areas for improvement
including on quality of services delivered and the need to
document and utilize the lessons learned. The evaluation
team concluded that the next iteration of the programme
would have a key role to play in the transition towards a
more comprehensive national social protection framework
and programme.
Taking lessons learned from the programme evaluation,
a new aid mechanism more closely adapted to the com-
plex environment was developed for social protection andthe other major social sectors. Known as the Transition
Fund, the objective of the mechanism was to address
the central development challenge for Zimbabwe at that
time: the need to find a mechanism that brought partners
together in a programme rather than project approach, in
order to obtain national scale impact under line ministry
leadership, while also addressing the major donor and pol-
itical restrictions on the channelling of funds directly
through government.
The model contained the following features:
 Agreement between line ministry, donors and the
secretariat on the major objectives and national
targets of the programme which were fully aligned
with broader sectoral objectives and targets.
 Setting up of a steering committee comprising relevant
government ministries, bilateral donors, and United
Nations and civil society partners that was co-chaired
by a line ministry and a donor representative, with the
secretariat managed by UNICEF.
 Policies and priorities of the line ministry providing
the basis for the scope of work.
 UNICEF managing the programme and all financial
resources on behalf of the specific line ministry,
through pooled or ‘aligned’ funds*a, in accordance
with its own rules and regulations.
 The scope of work generally including a major
emphasis on service delivery at national scale with a
focus first, on arresting the decline, then on
accelerating progress against the relevant MDGs, as
well as efforts in policy reform and capacity building.
 Partnering with other United Nations agencies,
private sector and civil society organisations based
on comparative advantage and value for money, and
generally through competitive selection processes.
 Investing in robust monitoring and independent
evaluation mechanisms to ensure high degree of
accountability.
Based on the initial Programme of Support prototype
and lessons learned, similar transition programmes were
launched in other social sectors. The Educational Tran-
sitional Fund was launched in mid-2009. The Child Pro-
tection Fund was designed and launched in 2010. This
fund included the first national scale social cash transfer
programmes integrated with case management and just-
ice for children services. In addition, smaller pooled
funds have been launched for urban water, sanitation
and hygiene and for the Essential Medicines programme.
The latter has now been integrated into the Health Transi-
tion Fund launched in 2011. In total, more than $800
million of development assistance has been committed
through these transitional funds by more than ten bilateral
donors through 2015 (Table 2).
Table 2 Overview of transition funds managed by UNICEF in Zimbabwe
Sector Name Duration Scope Funding levels (USD) Major
donors




OVC programmes evolving into
integrated child and social protection
including cash transfers, justice for
children and case management
Phase 1: 70 million UK
Germany


















2011–2015 Rural WASH including borehole drilling,








Learning materials and textbooks
evolving into focus on quality of and
access to basic education including a
new school grants programme,
comprehensive curriculum review
and support for second chance
programmes for out of school youth
Phase 1: 50 million EC
Norway












Health transition fund 2009–2011 Essential medicines evolving into
comprehensive MNCH and health
systems support, including essential
medicines, human resources, and
support to recurrent costs at
health facility level
Phase 1: 70 million EC
2011–2015 (phase 2) UK
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each fund operates in a slightly different manner de-
pending on the specific sector dynamics. The steering
committee, co-chaired by a senior government official in
that sector (such as the Minister or Permanent Secre-
tary) and a donor representative, helps to determine the
priorities for the fund and ensures full alignment with
the national sector plan. In fact, in all sectors in which
they are operational, the transition funds are providing
the major source of non-salary funding for the national
programme in that sector as well as the major donor co-
ordination platform. The steering committee, which gen-
erally meets monthly, consists of all major stakeholders
in that sector, including representatives from all major
donors (including those not contributing to the funddirectly), other relevant ministries, international and na-
tional NGO partners and relevant United Nations agen-
cies. Decisions are generally made by consensus. Given
the donor restrictions, funds are managed by UNICEF and
expenditure is made against the agreed plan and budget
lines. Because funds are generally non-earmarked and
pooled, the steering committee can re-prioritise if needs
change or another donor, not providing funding through
the pool, decides to cover an area originally covered by
the fund. All United Nations financial and procurement
procedures are followed, including competitive tendering
for procurement of goods and services. Implementation
is through sub-national government structures directly,
where they are functioning, or through the United Na-
tions, private sector or civil society partners. Selection of
Figure 2 Structure of the transition funds.
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committee of the steering committee consisting of govern-
ment, United Nations and donor representatives. Progress
reviews are commissioned annually and mid-term and
end of cycle evaluations are conducted by independent en-
tities. One of the critical differences in implementation of
these funds has been the unique and multiple roles
entrusted to UNICEF; UNICEF acts as the secretariat of
the mechanism, manages funds and procurement, assists
the relevant ministry in donor and programme coordin-
ation as well as provides additional technical capacity
as required in specific areas. These multiple roles, which
of course go well beyond the conventional role of fund
manager, were the subject of much debate in the design
of the funds, most notably on how to manage issues
surrounding potential conflict of interest. UNICEF was
chosen as the fund manager and secretariat because of
its track record in the relevant sectors (health, education,
wash, social protection), expertise on procurement, exist-
ing good relationships with both line ministries and do-
nors and, as the largest and most well-staffed of the
United Nations agencies in Zimbabwe, its ability to man-
age risks of such large scale operations in a difficult polit-
ical context. Other partners particularly those in the
private sector were considered for certain elements (pro-
curement, payment of health workers) but none were
deemed to be able to cover the full range of activities. Inaddition, the operational environment for NGOs was dif-
ficult. In sum, few other partners were deemed realistic
alternatives to UNICEF.
Discussion
For the purposes of this paper, we are focusing on the
results of the transition fund model- which was the
major source of large-scale funding for the education,
wash and social protection sectors through this period
and for non-HIV health funding. In the first few years of
implementation, the transitional fund mechanisms have
achieved the following results:
 More than 24 million textbooks (as well as
stationery, sporting kits and storage cabinets) have
been provided to all 8,000 primary and secondary
schools in all core subjects, taking the ratio of pupils
to textbooks from 10:1 to 1:1.
 Around 500,000 orphans and vulnerable children
were supported with multi-sectoral programmes
that improved access to services, participation and
enjoyment of basic rights.
 An additional 500,000 orphans and vulnerable
children have had their school fees paid annually.
 The first national social cash transfer programme for
the extremely poor has been initiated, reaching
20,000 households.
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consistently supplied with the basic package of
essential medicines and all vaccine requirements
dramatically reducing stock-outs (Figure 3).
 All 20 major urban centres were supplied with water
treatment chemicals and technical support for
rehabilitation of water treatment plants to bring the
cholera outbreak under control.
Results in the health sector
In terms of detailed results in the health sector, the re-
cent Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey carried out by
the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency shows positive
recent trends in both the reduction of under 5 and ma-
ternal mortality [25]. The authors of the report attribute
these changes to the programmes supported through the
Health Transition Fund. The main justification for their
conclusion is that no other major new initiatives have
been implemented in the sector that could explain this
progress. In addition, process indicators improved in the
period between the two nationally representative Mul-
tiple Indicator Cluster Surveys of 2009 and 2014 and
much of this progress occurred in recent years. These
improvements included: expanded programme on im-
munisation coverage (37% to 69%); exclusive breastfeed-
ing (26% to 41%); post-newborn care coverage (12 to
85%); skilled birth attendant coverage (60% to 80%), four
ante-natal sessions coverage (57% to 70%) and postnatal
care of the mother (27% to 78%). Furthermore, there
were documented declines in disease specific morbidity
for malaria, HIV and vaccine-preventable diseases andFigure 3 Trends in availability of selected essential medicines in heal
programme in 2009.that there have been no major outbreaks of cholera or
measles since the Health Transition Fund commenced.
All evidence points to the fact that the Health Transition
Fund has made a major contribution to these results.
The findings of the Mid-Term Review of the Health
Transition Fund in July 2014 conducted by Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine also provide strong evidence
for system wide improvements, albeit modest in some
areas. In terms of human resources for health, vacancy
rates amongst health workers have declined by 5% (from
21% to 16% during the period 2012–2014) and, since
2012, 2000 new midwives have been trained and deployed.
The number of doctors at district level has doubled and
the total number of village health workers has increased
by 4000. In terms of reductions of inequality, user fees had
been a major financial barrier to access for the most vul-
nerable population. One of the pillars of the Health Tran-
sition Fund, the health service fund has been providing
primary health care clinics and district and provincial hos-
pitals monthly stipends for their running costs. As a result
94% of PHC clinics and 82% of hospitals are now provid-
ing free care to pregnant women and children under 5. Fi-
nally, in terms of government allocations to the health
sector during this period- budgets allocated doubled from
US$174 million in 2010 to US$381 million in 2013 but
disbursement varied from 62% to 86% of allocated
amounts. However, at 9.9% of the total national budget,
government allocations to the health sector are still well
below the 15% target set by the Abuja declaration.
It is important to note that in preceding years, the
donor approach had emphasized two alternative models-th facilities after implementation of the essential medicines
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delivered by NGOs and more vertical mechanisms, the
largest being the Global Fund in the health sector. By
taking the health sector as an example, it is possible to
compare and contrast the potential results that may have
been achieved using one of these alternative models,
assessing them on the criteria of scale of results, adher-
ence to national priorities, building on national capaci-
ties and systems, and risk management.
First, we believe that such results at national scale
would have been very difficult to achieve using other
mechanisms. Because of fragmentation, lack of econ-
omies of scale, or a vertical focus, neither model had
managed to prevent further deterioration in the health
sector (or any of the other social sectors), which had col-
lapsed in 2008. By contrast, the Health Transition Fund
managed to pool resources together, for the first time on
that scale, against national sectoral targets, thus contrib-
uting to stabilizing the sector and, according to recent
outcome and impact level data, may have contributed to
significant progress on the health-related MDGs.
Second in terms of following national priorities, in this
politically-charged environment of sanctions, the donors
had previously favoured humanitarian mechanisms pre-
cisely because such mechanisms allowed them to imple-
ment projects without having to formally consult
government. Global Funds had involved government offi-
cials in national mechanisms such as the Country Coord-
inating Mechanism but within the strict confines of
Global Fund priorities at the time-determined in Geneva-
particularly HIV and to a lesser extent tuberculosis and
malaria. Furthermore as a disease-specific funding stream,
the Global Fund did not have the latitude, flexibility or re-
sources, to truly address broader health system issues such
as human resources shortfalls and the stock-outs of critical
essential medicines which had resulted in collapse of the
sector and were the over-riding national priorities at the
time. By contrast the transition funds were designed by
teams comprising members of in-country partners includ-
ing senior government officials from line ministries, do-
nors and the United Nations. These teams were already
involved in the relevant sectors and fully cognizant of sec-
toral priorities.
Similarly in terms of building on national capacities
and systems, neither alternative model was fit for pur-
pose in this regard; the humanitarian actors because of
their perceived need to remain independent of the Gov-
ernment of Zimbabwe as well as the short-term nature
of their funding and the global funds because issues such
as capacity building were seen as beyond their remit,
vested interests within the Country Coordinating Mechan-
ism maintained a narrow focus on HIV, and working
through national systems was perceived as somewhat
risky. By contrast the health transition fund was designedin such a way that systems building was a core focus of 3
of the 4 pillars and the pooling of resources allowed for
flexibility in approach. In addition, a code of conduct
signed by all Health Transition Fund steering committee
members committed them to supporting national prior-
ities and all of the over-arching goals of the fund, not
merely those of interest to any one donor agency or imple-
menting partner.
Finally, in terms of risk management, because the
locus of decision making for both alternative mecha-
nisms (donor country capitals or executive board of the
Global Fund) remained predominately the donor capitals
it was more difficult for local actors to adapt to the rap-
idly changing political context in Zimbabwe and to as-
sess and re-assess risk. By contrast, once resources had
been committed to the Health Transition Fund, the
steering committee provided a forum for analysing risk
and finding local solutions to addressing risks. This was
facilitated by the fact that funding was pooled and hence
any individual donor felt that their risks were also
shared. In addition, the large, combined field presence of
the major health sector partners on the steering commit-
tee and commitment to regular monitoring and independ-
ent evaluation reassured donors that problems occurring
would be identified quickly. This in turn contributed to
less risk aversion and support for programmes such as
large scale health retention schemes which were previ-
ously considered too risky by most donors.
Collateral benefits of transition funds
In addition, in terms of added value, other ‘collateral’
benefits of this model are also becoming evident. First,
prior to the existence of the steering committees of these
funds, there were no fora for systematic sectoral-level
engagement between donors and the relevant line minis-
tries. The steering committees have thus provided a
strong platform for sectoral-level coordination, harmon-
isation of donor positions and, notwithstanding the
sanctions environment and associated restrictions, align-
ment behind government policies, programmes and pri-
orities. In every case where a transition fund exists, the
fund has become the dominant coordination mechanism
for major donors to that sector. Such fora have assisted
in building relationships between donors and line minis-
try officials which in some cases had been non-existent
or problematic for several years.
Second, such mechanisms have provided a more struc-
tured approach to supporting longer term priorities in
each sector, reducing fragmentation in the process. The
transitional funds have assisted in the evolution from a
purely humanitarian focus to ‘humanitarian plus,’b and
now to recovery and transition. Increasingly, and partly
as a direct result of these mechanisms, donors are now
providing longer term and more predictable funding for
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tices, economies of scale, and transparent procurement
processes, the funds have been able to achieve impres-
sive value for money. For example, in the areas of pro-
curement of water treatment chemicals and medicines,
taking advantage of global and regional UNICEF con-
tracts, major savings have been made. Under the Educa-
tional Transitional Fund, the procurement of textbooks
alone saved more than US$50 million allowing the pur-
chase of the national requirement of both secondary and
primary books to remain well within the original budget
envelope for primary books alone.
Fourth, in each of these sectors, the transition funds
have created a powerful platform to advocate for critical
sectoral policy reforms. In education, agreement has
been reached to embark on a comprehensive national re-
view of the curriculum as well as also providing the
forum for the development of a Medium-Term Educa-
tion Sector Plan, now approved by Cabinet. In health,
one of the main objectives of the Health Transition Fund
is to facilitate the removal of all user fees for pregnant
women and children under 5 by the end of 2013. In
addition, large scale support to supplement the salaries
of government health workers has resulted in the return
of doctors to many district and rural hospitals. The
Child Protection Fund has resulted in the first national
scale social cash transfer programme and is accelerating
the national momentum around developing a compre-
hensive social protection framework. In water and sani-
tation, the reform of national inter-ministerial Water
Sanitation Hygiene coordination structures has been im-
plemented and the new national water and sanitation
policy is being drafted. The transition funds have also
aligned with the objectives, implementation and targets
of the country’s Medium Term Plan and provided an ef-
fective coordinating platform for the monitoring and
evaluation of Medium Term Plan targets in the social
sectors – the same targets that are reflected in the tran-
sition funds.
Finally, by raising the profile of the social sectors
themselves, the transition funds have contributed to the
national debate around the need to increase the govern-
ment budget commitments to these sectors as well as to
the momentum for taking full national ownership over
these programmes as soon as is feasible. For example,
when a local newspaper recently falsely reported that
UNICEF was withdrawing its financial support from the
Basic Education Assistance Module (the social protec-
tion programme that provides school fees for more than
500,000 orphans and vulnerable children annually), a
major national debate ensued on the need to rely on na-
tional resources to fund such critical programmes. We
have witnessed similar debates in relation to national
contribution to antiretroviral medication requirementsand to supporting procurement of the water treatment
chemicals that ensure safe water in urban centres. Such
debates have resulted in formal parliamentary reviews
ultimately resulting in increasing treasury commitments
to the social sectors from 33 per cent of the total budget
in 2010 to 39 per cent in 2012 [26].
All of the transition funds have been subjected to an-
nual review, conducted by an independent entity follow-
ing terms of reference defined by the steering committee
of the fund. The Educational Transitional Fund has
benefited from two such reviews in its first phase of
operations. Both reviews found the Educational Transi-
tional Fund to be a relevant project that was well
managed, effective in meeting its objectives, and cost
effective. In particular, it was noted that the textbook
procurement, which resulted in a cost saving through
transparent procurement processes, effective negotiation
and economies of scale, ‘had delivered far in excess of
initial expectations…’ Similar findings have been noted
for the essential medicines programme and for the Child
Protection Fund as well as the urban water sanitation
hygiene programme.
In terms of the essential medicines programme, in its
2011 assessment of DFID’s support to the health sector,
the United Kingdom’s Independent Commission for Aid
Impact noted positive results in all areas assessed (objec-
tives, delivery, impact, and learning) [27]. The report com-
mented that DFID helped to avoid the total collapse of the
health system during the crisis years by providing essential
medicines and supplementing the salaries of key staff.
The essential medicines programme was also credited
with obtaining economies of scale and value for money.
Several evaluations of the urban water sanitation hygiene
programme have been commissioned by AusAID – the
major donor. All have found the programme to be rele-
vant, effective and efficient and have credited it as a major
factor in bringing cholera under control [28]. In relation
to the Child Protection Fund, the latest donor review in
2012 found the combined cash transfer and child protec-
tion programme to be functioning well scoring an ‘A’ over-
all for meeting all expectations. The review emphasised
the strong national ownership of the Child Protection
Fund programme.
Discussion and lessons learned
Importance of an understanding of the political economy
and context
An understanding of the specific history of the social
sectors in Zimbabwe and particular challenges facing the
current senior government officials during this period
was critical in order to tailor the support of the inter-
national community appropriately. From the period of
Independence in 1980 to the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe had
had very strong government-led social sectors with only
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tions agencies or NGOs. And despite serious under-
investment in the social sectors for more than a decade
prior to the crisis of 2008–9, large scale emigration of
skilled workers, and a serious decline in capacity that oc-
curred at all levels during this period, the senior civil
servants in some line ministries retained a strong trad-
ition of public sector leadership and of managing for re-
sults. However, because in the past significant external
resources had not been required, the majority of ministers
or senior civil servants were neither entirely familiar with
the international aid architecture nor had they had much
experience of coordinating multiple stakeholders and bal-
ancing various external interest groups. These challenges
were also compounded by the fact that the MDC-T and
MDC-M ministers, being members of the former oppos-
ition movement, had had virtually no experience of gov-
erning or running large sectoral ministries.
One of the major reasons for the relatively successful
implementation of these mechanisms has been an in-
depth understanding of the priorities, processes and
players in each of the sectors. The transition funds were
designed in-country, in a collaborative manner, by exist-
ing major stakeholders with expertise and experience in
those sectors, with priorities based on existing sector
plans. In addition, the mechanisms, although following a
general prototype, have been tailored to the sectoral
context and helped support national institutions and sys-
tems as well as sectoral line ministry leadership. Finally,
in a complex political environment, cognizance of the
historical context and sensitivity to perceptions in a
highly polarised political environment has been critical
[29]. Thus one of the major pitfalls of multi-donor trust
funds, that of funds being born in a vacuum, has gener-
ally been avoided from the outset [23].
In addition, respect for the multi-lateral nature of the
UN system and its ability to transcend, and be perceived
to transcend party politics has been a critical factor in
the successful implementation of the funds. The UN
agencies have played an important brokering role be-
tween donors and the government, between NGOs and
the government, and even between different government
ministries led by opposing parties. The Independent
Commission for Aid Impact report on the health sector
commented that partners found ‘working with the UN
in Zimbabwe at this time to be effective, given the polit-
ical situation.’ A small group of players, a clear focus of
purpose and some notably high-quality personnel in the
different United Nations agencies were identified as the
reasons. [27]. Of note is that several ministers have com-
mented that they were relieved that procurement was
being managed by the United Nations during this phase
because procurement processes have often been used in
Zimbabwe to tarnish political opponents.Flexible and pragmatic approaches and evolution of
priorities
A potential critique of the New Deal approach outlined
in Busan in 2011 is that the goal of an all-inclusive
process to establish one vision and one plan is too ambi-
tious in the polarised environments of post-conflict or
fragile states. In Zimbabwe, the overall development of
the national aid coordination mechanisms has not pro-
gressed in more than three years and the national recon-
ciliation commission and constitutional reform processes
have also been fraught with problems and delays. Security
sector reform did not progress at all prior to the 2013
elections and is now unlikely to be a priority for the new
ZANU-PF government. In complex political emergencies,
including Afghanistan and Iraq, the multi-donor trust
fund model has tended to include a broad range of prior-
ities, from the relatively non-contentious social sectors to
the more controversial issues such as justice, constitu-
tional or security sector reform [30]. In such environ-
ments, progress in design, launch and implementation
tends to occur at the rate of the most controversial
governance-oriented programmes. The sector-based tran-
sition fund model used in Zimbabwe to date has generally
avoided these pitfalls by focusing on realistic and progres-
sive targets in relatively non-controversial areas. The evo-
lution has generally been from a simpler supply-oriented
programme (procurement of textbooks or water treatment
chemicals or essential medicines) to a more sophisticated
scope of work (curriculum reform, rehabilitation of water
treatment plants, removal of user fees in the health sec-
tor). This evolution of priorities has been tactical as well
as strategic. For example, the education sector, had a pain-
ful, colonial legacy of discrimination, a highly polarised
ministry divided along political lines, and no recent history
of large scale donor funding. An initial focus on any
programme other than procurement would not have been
feasible in the first one to two years. However, phase two
of the Educational Transitional Fund has involved training
of parent- teacher associations, establishing a new national
decentralised mechanism to support direct grants to
schools, curriculum reform, and support to robust educa-
tion management information systems, all designed to im-
prove school governance and accountability at the local
level. Such a scope of work would not have been feasible
in the initial post-election period. Indeed had a multi-
donor trust fund been developed in Zimbabwe in 2008–9,
that had included security, judicial and constitutional re-
form in combination with support to the social sectors,
then the entire programme of work would likely have been
stalled.
In turn, in each sector, incremental gains have pro-
gressively built trust and confidence, as well as contrib-
uting to donor harmonisation and alignment, leading to
the model now being characterized as a ‘shadow SWAp.’
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over-arching mechanism, when delays caused by political
or operational issues have affected one sector, progress
has continued in other sectors. Finally, although the
transition funds are designed to progressively build na-
tional capacity to manage funding and coordination inde-
pendently, the mechanism is also flexible enough to
continue to operate in much the same way even in the
event of a return to a more unstable, humanitarian situ-
ation (as was predicted may happen during the election
cycle in 2013). This attribute is what has been termed ‘fu-
ture proofing’ by in-country DFID officials.
Emphasis on risk management and risk sharing
The transition funds have provided a relatively ‘safe’
mechanism for donors to fund the social sectors in an
otherwise politically and fiscally risky environment. This
attribute has in turn helped ensure significant funding
for the social sectors at a time when more than 70% of
the government budget was allocated for civil service
salaries. However, the safety provided requires a very
pro-active risk management process. Such a process be-
gins with a strong analysis of potential risks, a shared
understanding of the level of tolerance of risk across
partners, strong risk communication within and between
organisations particularly at ‘crisis’ moments, robust risk
mitigation and a sense of solidarity and trust among
partners. The latter is particularly important as crises
will inevitably occur in such polarised environments; it
is critical at these moments that no partner feels that
they are bearing all of the risk [31]. Risks that may have
not been feasible to take alone may become more man-
ageable if many partners are willing to support a
programme. In the context of the transition funds, the
pooling of funds has assisted in developing a sense that
risks are also ‘pooled’ or shared. A robust response by
line ministries, rapid risk communication measures and
strong solidarity among partners in Zimbabwe has helped
ensure confidence in the integrity of the programmes.
In particular, the capacity for public relations in fragile
state environments is often neglected [32]. In the volatile
context of Zimbabwe, for example, the highly polarised
media has attempted to embroil the transition funds in
inter-party political battles on several occasions by mak-
ing false accusations and sensationalist claims in regards
to the programmes supported. However, no serious pol-
itical interference with the work of the transition funds
has been encountered [33] and the progress has contin-
ued through the national elections and post-election
period. Finally, one practical consideration in managing
risk in such environments must be taken into account:
managing risks costs money and the riskier the environ-
ment, the more it will cost. For example, in the design
phase of the new cash grants system of the CPF, thepotential risk of local politicians putting pressure on civil
servants to favour one geographical area or beneficiary
in targeting was assessed as highly significant. In order
to mitigate this risk several additional measures were
put in place when the programme design was finalised;
these measures included contracting out separate and
independent providers for each step of the process: the
targeting of households; the distribution of the cash; the
verification exercise; and the monitoring and evaluation
of the programme. While more costly, these mechanisms
have ensured the integrity of the programme thus far,
and have generated a high degree of confidence in the
transparency and fairness of the programme.
Emphasis on monitoring and evaluation and sustainability
Given the very high stakes and the high degree of visibility
of these programmes in major donor capitals, as well as
strong and differing opinions of various constituencies, in-
cluding the Zimbabwean diaspora and the polarised
media, additional investments in internal monitoring and
independent evaluation have been required. In order to re-
spond to these needs, UNICEF, in collaboration with the
University of Zimbabwe, − with the support of a private
philanthropic foundation based in the US (the Nduna
Foundation) – has set up a centre (the Collaborative
Centre on Operational Research and Evaluation) that can
respond to the additional data requirements. In addition
to helping rebuild sectoral information systems, the Col-
laborative Centre supports regular cross-sectional surveys
and qualitative research.
Fully fledged capacity building approaches and concrete
plans for gradual transfer of management responsibilities
have thus far been stymied by tight donor restrictions on
funding flowing to government. However, in July 2012, the
European Union announced the plan to fully re-activate
bilateral aid mechanisms with Zimbabwe by 2014. The
European Union also announced that the targeted sanc-
tions would be reviewed once certain commitments are
met. Other OECD donors are likely to follow suit. Further-
more, prior to the 2013 elections, the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund re-engagement process with
the Zimbabwe government had begun, possibly leading to
the full re-engagement by the Bretton Woods institutions
by early 2014.
If donor restrictions dissipate in the future and com-
prehensive capacity building plans are able to be de-
signed and implemented, it will be critical to monitor,
not only the results being achieved through service de-
livery, but also the policy reforms being successfully ne-
gotiated. In addition, monitoring systems should include
indicators that capture the improvements in national
capacity in technical or programmatic areas as well as in
operations areas, such as procurement, human resources
planning and public financial management. Furthermore,
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ively the effects on donor behaviour in accordance with
the commitments made in the Paris Principles and New
Deal. Ultimately the aim of all the transition funds is to
hand over full responsibility for management to line
ministries by the end of 2015. The full implications of
the results of the elections in 2013 on these plans re-
main to be seen.
Challenges and limitations
The major challenges in implementation of the transi-
tion fund model have been the following: a) since discus-
sions are sectorally based and managed, there is a risk
that such programmes are not fully captured by Ministry
of Finance as ‘on-budget’ or simply result in substitution
of domestic resources for aid; b) given the ongoing re-
strictions imposed by the sanctions environment, there
has been a constant tension between donor demands for
separate financial management outside government sys-
tems and the capacity building requirements of govern-
ment following years of underinvestment; c) given the
results being achieved, there has been a constant need
for vigilance in ensuring success is not ‘captured’ by one
political party for potential electoral gain resulting in
further polarization and backlash.
While Zimbabwe, with its history of effective govern-
ment social sectors, a well-educated civil service, a
highly literate general population, and a sanctions re-
gime in place, certainly represents a specific context, we
believe that many of the lessons learned in implementing
these funds are potentially generalizable and at least
aspects may be replicable to other settings. First several
countries, currently facing complex emergencies, such as
Syria, Mali, Cote D’ Ivoire, Egypt, Burma, Sudan, and
Iraq have a similar recent history of periods of relative
stability and functional government systems being in
place prior to their current crises. Second, in some cases,
sanctions or other donor restrictions have also been im-
posed. In addition, the model may be useful as an in-
terim financing mechanism to ensure continuity of
critical social sector service delivery (without establish-
ing entirely parallel structures) when government-donor
relations (temporarily) deteriorate due to political, human
rights or accountability concerns. Recent examples of po-
tential applicability in this category include Madagascar,
Malawi and Uganda. Finally, in keeping with the current
global emphasis on building resilience, we believe that var-
iants of this model could be developed for complex emer-
gencies where shorter cycle humanitarian mechanisms
have failed to deliver on longer-term system strengthening
and local capacity building objectives (such as Somalia,
Chad, South Sudan, etc.). While sustainability is difficult
to assess in such chronic emergencies, it is clear that this
model may represent a major advance on the primaryalternative of using short-term humanitarian funding,
mainly through civil society and often in parallel to na-
tional institutions and systems. In addition, initial evidence
suggests that donor support will remain strong through the
period through 2014–15 and that government ownership
remains high even if due to the economic situation, it has
been difficult for government to increase its domestic fi-
nancing more significantly. Finally, the authors are not sug-
gesting that this model is applicable for acute humanitarian
crises or that it replaces, disease specific mechanisms. We
believe this model may be more broadly applicable in
chronic emergencies, transitional situations, and for fragile
states when more predictability and flexibility of funding is
required and where the emphasis should shift towards na-
tional capacity building and use of national systems.
Summary
The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreed
at Busan suggests that current ways of working in fragile
states need to be revisited. Transitioning out of fragility
is a long and challenging process. Processes of political
dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusive-
ness, and leadership. International partners can often by-
pass national interests and actors, providing aid in
overly technocratic ways that under-estimate the import-
ance of harmonising with the national and local context,
and support short-term results at the expense of
medium- to long-term goals including capacity building.
The transition fund model has provided a mechanism
for development partners to support the social sectors and
people of Zimbabwe during a period of complex political
transition when donors were not willing to support the
Government of Zimbabwe directly. Since 2008, these
mechanisms have resulted in significant national scale im-
pact in the major social sectors. In addition to the direct
and tangible benefits to the Zimbabwean people, other
more indirect impacts on aid alignment and harmonisa-
tion as well as policy reform are already becoming evident.
The transition fund model is proving to be a useful tool
for the current context in Zimbabwe; as of mid-2012,
more than US$800 million has been firmly committed to
these and related initiatives through 2015. In terms of
non-food development assistance, the transition funds
now account for around half of all official development as-
sistance to Zimbabwe. As the political situation and the
relationship with donors improve in Zimbabwe, the transi-
tion funds have the potential to provide a bridge to more
traditional development programming. In addition, by fo-
cusing on realistic and tangible goals in each of the social
sectors, the mechanisms have generally avoided the highly
contested issues surrounding control of external funding
and been able to demonstrate much more progress, more
quickly than other components of the Medium-Term Plan
or the overall aid coordination mechanism.
Salama et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights 2014, 14:35 Page 15 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/14/35A body of evidence through annual reviews and inde-
pendent evaluations is accumulating that supports these
findings. Formal independent evaluations are planned to
document the national impact at the mid-term and end
cycle for each fund. This sectoral evidence, combined
with an evaluation of the overall effect of the funds on
donor harmonisation, alignment and government owner-
ship, will help to provide a formal evidence-base for the
use of this model in other countries facing such transi-
tions. The new post-election political reality in Zimbabwe
is likely to further test the assumptions and durability of
the mechanisms. We would recommend an over-arching,
multi-sectoral and fully independent evaluation. Such an
evaluation should include a formal review of the role and
performance of UNICEF, assess its role in terms of man-
aging potential conflict of interests, efficiency and value
for money as well as assessing the potential for other part-
ners to play similar roles in the next phase of the transi-
tion funds and in other contexts. If such an evaluation
confirms the preliminary findings and final impact assess-
ments, such flexible and pragmatic partnership models
have the potential to be institutionalised as a practical
method of implementing the New Deal for engagement
with fragile states.
Endnotes
aIn some cases, donors were not able to formally pool
their funds but were able to support the broad programme
while retaining some level of earmarking against some of
the agreed major result areas.
bHumanitarian Plus was a termed used by donors in
Zimbabwe from 2009 to indicate their desire to support
the social sectors beyond support to purely humanitar-
ian interventions while not straying too close to devel-
opment which would require a more formal political
engagement.
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